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Writings
- Law Review Articles about Robert H. Jackson
- Articles About Robert H. Jackson
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- Early Life & Career (1892-1933)
- Treasury Department, Bureau of Internal Revenue (1934-1936)
- Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division (1936)
- Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division (1937)
- Solicitor General of the United States (1938-1940)
- Attorney General of the United States (1940-1941)
- Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1941-1954)
- Nuremberg Prosecutor (1945-1946)
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- Early Life & Career (1892-1934)
- Treasury Department, Bureau of Internal Revenue (1934-1936)
- Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division (1936)
- Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division (1937)
- Solicitor General of the United States (1938-1940)
- Attorney General of the United States (1940-1941)
- Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1941-1954)
- Nuremberg Prosecutor (1945-1946)
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Speeches
- Early Life & Career (1892-1934)
- Treasury Department, Bureau of Internal Revenue (1934-1936)
- Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division (1936)
- Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division (1937)
- Attorney General of the United States (1940-1941)
- Solicitor General of the United States (1938-1940)
- Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1941-1954)
- Nuremberg Prosecutor (1945-1946)
- Supreme Court Opinions
Concurring opinion, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (Nov. 5, 1951)
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Dissenting statement, National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (June 4, 1951)
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Opinion of the Court, Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (March 1, 1943)
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Opinion of the Court, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (June 14, 1943)
Background: In January of 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education passed a resolution that made a daily flag salute a requirement in all public schools for both teachers and students. Refusal to participate in the flag salute by teachers was grounds for dismissal and readmission was to be denied until compliance was achieved. For students, the punishment was expulsion from school that would be considered an “unlawful absence” and force the child’s parents or guardians to be liable for prosecution on charges of delinquency. The Barnette sisters were Jehovah’s Witnesses and their father would not allow them to salute the flag as it violated the religion’s Ten Commandments which laid out that the only thing to be worshipped was God. Barnette brought suit in the United States District Court seeking an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the resolution. The suit alleged that the regulation was an unconstitutional denial of religious freedom, freedom of speech, and was invalid under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Supreme Court: Jackson wrote the majority opinion for the Court, which was split 6-3. Jackson held that making it compulsory to salute the flag and pledge allegiance was a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and was not able to be justified as a means of achieving patriotism and national unity. Jackson reasoned that saying the pledge of allegiance was speech as it communicated an expression of set ideas. By making this speech a requirement it violated the First Amendment values.
Legacy: The case was the definitive final answer in a long line of cases regarding religious liberty under the freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment brought by Jehovah’s Witnesses. It overruled their own earlier decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis which upheld mandatory flag salute and expressions of patriotism within public schools. The case has become a part of our nation’s civic pride, that in public schools every child has the right to believe and practice the ideas or faith that they choose.
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Dissenting opinion, Land v. Dollar, 341 U.S. 737 (June 4, 1951)
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Concurring opinion, Youngstown v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (June 2, 1952)
Background: From 1950 until 1953 the United States was involved in the Korean War. In order to keep inflation down President Truman did not impose price controls, instead he created a board who monitored price inflation, workers’ wages and sought to ensure labor disputes were avoided. The United Steelworkers union threatened a strike in April of 1952, once it became clear that the strike could not be averted President Truman issued an Executive Order on April 8, 1952. The order directed Secretary of Commerce, Charles Sawyer, to seize operation of the steel mills. The Secretary did so by nationalizing the steel mills and directing their presidents to operate them according to federal directions. President Truman justified the seizure as an act stemming from his broad constitutional power as the President of the United States and the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The steel companies brought suit against the Secretary in a Federal District Court.
Supreme Court: The Court ruled that the seizure of the mills was not authorized by the Constitution or by any law of the United States. In fact, the congressional considerations evident and expressed in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 expressly rejected authorization for the government to seize property as a way to prevent work stoppage and settle labor disputes. Further, the President’s action was not able to be justified using his military power as the Commander in Chief and the power he sought to exercise was that of lawmaking, which is constitutionally vested with Congress alone. Jackson wrote a concurring opinion. He wrote that when determining whether the executive has authority there are three general circumstances. First, when the President acts with the express or implied authorization of Congress then the President’s authority is at its greatest. Second, in the absence of either a congressional grant or prohibition then the President acts in a zone of twilight. In this circumstance, Congress and the President may have concurrent authority. In this zone of twilight, an actual test on authority will be dependent on the events and the contemporary theory of law existing at the time. The third circumstance is when the President takes measures that go against the expressed will of Congress, his power is at its lowest. Jackson placed the action of President Truman in the third category making the order to seize the mills invalid.
Legacy: The three prong test set out in Jackson’s concurrence is widely used when considering the limits of presidential power. The case itself is the premier analytical framework in assessing presidential authority, especially in later cases like the Watergate scandal with President Nixon.
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Dissenting opinion, United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954)
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Concurring Opinion, United States v. Swift & Co., 318 U.S. 442 (March 15, 1943)
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